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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Amanda Lucy Belle Diaz appeals from the judgment entered upon her 
conviction for felony driving under the influence.  For the first time on appeal, 
Diaz complains that an officer impermissibly commented on her exercise of her 
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures by 
explaining that Diaz opted for a urinalysis rather than a blood draw, and a 
different officer impermissibly opined that, based on his drug evaluation of Diaz, 
he concluded she was driving under the influence of several narcotics.    
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 
 Corporal Terry Hodges initiated a traffic stop on Diaz’s vehicle after 
someone reported that she may have been driving under the influence.  (Trial 
Tr., p.158, L.23 – p.161, L.12.)  When Corporal Hodges made contact with Diaz, 
Diaz admitted she was “currently suspended.”  (Trial Tr., p.162, Ls.5-9.)  Diaz 
was also behaving “very erratic[ally].”  (Trial Tr., p.162, Ls.10-21.)  Officer Dustin 
Moe arrived on scene shortly after the stop was initiated.  (Trial Tr., p.162, L.22 – 
p.163, L.5.)  Officer Moe “took over the traffic stop” “at that point” based on 
Corporal Hodges’ belief that Diaz was under the influence.  (Trial Tr., p.163, 
Ls.17-22.)  Officer Moe performed field sobriety tests on Diaz, which indicated 
Diaz was impaired, but not by alcohol.  (Trial Tr., p.179, L.1 – p.195, L.21.)  As a 
result, Officer Moe arrested Diaz for “suspicion of DUI.”  (Trial Tr., p.195, Ls.18-
21.)   
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After a breath alcohol test confirmed Diaz was not under the influence of 
alcohol, Officer Moe determined a drug recognition evaluation (“DRE”) was 
needed.  (Trial Tr., p.196, L.10 – p.198, L.5.)  Officer Morgan Carter conducted 
the DRE.  (Trial Tr., p.198, Ls.10-23.)  The results of the DRE indicated Diaz was 
under the influence of “CNS depressants, CNS stimulants, and narcotic 
analgesics.”  (Trial Tr., p.276, L.14 – p.277, L.5.)  A subsequent urinalysis 
confirmed the presence of methamphetamines, opiates, amphetamines, 
Methadone and Oxycodone in Diaz’s system.  (Trial Tr., p.337, L.7 – p.338, L.20; 
Exhibit 3.)   
The state charged Diaz with felony driving under the influence and 
misdemeanor driving without privileges.  (R., pp.6-7, 14-15, 19, 29-30.)  The 
state also alleged Diaz is a persistent violator.1  (R., pp.52-53.)  The jury found 
Diaz guilty of driving under the influence and driving without privileges, and Diaz 
admitted the felony enhancement for driving under the influence, and admitted 
the persistent violator enhancement.  (R., pp.123-124; Trial Tr., p.394, L.19 – 
p.400, L.15.)  The court imposed a unified 15-year sentence, with three years 
fixed, for felony driving under the influence, but retained jurisdiction.2 
(R., pp.125-127.)  Diaz timely appealed.  (R., pp.130-132.)   
                                            
1 Diaz was on probation at the time she was arrested in this case.  (See R., 
p.57.)   
 
2 The court imposed a concurrent 90-day jail sentence for driving without 




 Diaz states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Whether Officer Moe and Officer Carter offered improper testimony 
which constitutes prosecutorial misconduct? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.6.) 
 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
Has Diaz failed to carry her burden of showing fundamental error with 
respect to her unpreserved claims that her rights were violated when an officer 
testified that Diaz opted for a urinalysis instead of a blood draw, and another 
officer testified that, based on a drug recognition evaluation, he concluded Diaz 





Diaz Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error With Respect To Her Unpreserved 
Claims Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
A. Introduction 
 At trial, Officer Moe testified, “There was discussion of whether she would 
submit to a blood draw having Meridian Fire and Paramedics come take a blood 
sample from her.  She did not consent to that, but did agree to provide a sample 
at the jail.”  (Trial Tr., p.201, Ls.11-18.)  For the first time on appeal, Diaz argues 
the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting this testimony from Officer 
Moe, claiming the testimony “was a gratuitous and prejudicial comment on [her] 
decision to exercise her Fourth Amendment rights.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.8 
(footnote omitted).)   
 Officer Carter also testified at trial.  His testimony included his opinion that 
Diaz was driving under the influence of several narcotics.  (Trial Tr., p.276, L.21 
– p.277, L.5.)  For the first time on appeal, Diaz contends this testimony 
exceeded the scope of what is a permissible expert opinion.  (Appellant’s Brief, 
pp.11-14.)  
 Diaz’s arguments fail.  Application of the law to the facts of this case 
shows Diaz has failed to carry her burden of establishing any error, much less 
fundamental error, entitling her to reversal of her conviction. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
A claim of error unpreserved for appellate review by a timely objection 
may only be considered on appeal if it “constitutes fundamental error.”  State v. 
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Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010).  In the 
absence of an objection “the appellate court’s authority to remedy that error is 
strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the defendant being 
deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a 
fair tribunal.”  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). 
Review without objection will not lie unless (1) the defendant demonstrates that 
“one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were violated”; 
(2) the constitutional error is “clear or obvious” on the record, “without the need 
for any additional information” including information “as to whether the failure to 
object was a tactical decision”; and (3) the “defendant must demonstrate that the 
error affected the defendant’s substantial rights,” generally by showing a 
reasonable probability that the error “affected the outcome of the trial court 
proceedings.”  Id. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. 
 
C. Diaz Has Failed To Carry Her Burden Of Demonstrating Fundamental 
Error In Relation To Her Unpreserved Claims Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
1. Officer Moe’s Unobjected-to Testimony That Diaz Opted For A 
Urinalysis Instead Of A Blood Draw Did Not Violate Any Of Diaz’s 
Constitutional Rights 
  
 During the direct examination of Officer Moe, the prosecutor asked 
whether, as part of the DRE, there is “an attempt to get some sort of fluid sample 
for testing.”  (Trial Tr., p.200, Ls.16-21.)  Officer Moe answered, “Yes, either a 
urine sample or a blood sample,” and explained that, “[w]ithin the City of 
Meridian, more often than not, [they] try to collect a urine sample.”  (Trial Tr., 
p.200, Ls.22-24.)  Officer Moe further testified that, because Diaz is female, a 
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male officer could not collect a urine sample from her, and there was no female 
officer available at the time.  (Trial Tr., p.200, L.25 – p.201, L.10.)  The 
prosecutor then asked if there was “further discussion with Ms. Diaz about things 
at that point,” and Officer Moe responded:  “There was.  There was discussion of 
whether she would submit to a blood draw having Meridian Fire and Paramedics 
come take a blood sample from her.  She did not consent to that, but did agree 
to provide a sample at the jail.”  (Trial Tr., p.201, Ls.11-18.)   
Unsurprisingly, Diaz did not object to the foregoing testimony.  (See Trial 
Tr., p.201.)  Nevertheless, Diaz claims on appeal that Officer Moe’s testimony 
was fundamental error because, she argues, it was an impermissible comment 
on her invocation of her Fourth Amendment rights.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.8.)  This 
argument is without merit and fails on all three prongs of the fundamental error 
test.  
Diaz contends Officer Moe’s “comment about [her] refusal to submit to a 
blood draw was a gratuitous and prejudicial comment on [her] decision to 
exercise her Fourth Amendment rights,” and, “[t]herefore,” she claims, she has 
demonstrated a clear violation of an “unwaived constitutional right[ ].”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.8 (footnote omitted).)  Diaz’s argument ignores the reality 
that she, in fact, waived the constitutional right she claims was violated.  That 
Diaz waived her Fourth Amendment rights is apparent from the entirety of Officer 
Moe’s statement, which was that Diaz opted for a urine sample as opposed to a 
blood draw.  (Trial Tr., p.201, Ls.14-18.)  Diaz cannot demonstrate constitutional 
error by ignoring the context of the statement she challenges.  What is clear in 
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the record is that Diaz waived her Fourth Amendment rights in relation to the 
testing performed.  Her argument that the opposite is true fails.   
Diaz has also failed to meet her burden under the third prong of the 
fundamental error test.  Under prong three, Diaz must “demonstrate that the 
error affected [her] substantial rights” by showing a reasonable probability that 
the error “affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings.”  Perry, 150 Idaho 
at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.  Diaz claims “[t]here was such a possibility in this case.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.9.)  In support of this argument, Diaz first asserts that “[t]he 
only purpose Officer Moe’s improper testimony could serve was to infer a 
consciousness of guilt” because the jury “had already heard [she] had consented 
to take a breathalyzer, which had come back negative,” and “had heard that she 
had also agreed to provide a urine sample.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.9.)  Diaz then 
reasons: 
[W]ith Officer Moe’s improper comment, the jury now heard that, 
despite her cooperation and her trying to show her innocence on 
those other tests, Ms. Diaz nevertheless refused to submit to a 
blood draw.  Thus, the jurors could have inferred she did not want 
officers to test her blood because it would show she was presently 
under the influence of some drug.  
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.9.)  Setting aside the argument that Diaz was “trying to show 
her innocence,” as opposed to complying with her Fourth Amendment probation 
waiver (see R., p.57), Diaz’s argument again ignores the actual context of Officer 
Moe’s testimony, which was that Diaz elected to provide a urine sample at the 
jail, rather than a blood sample to Meridian Fire and Paramedics.  There was no 
implication, or inference that could be drawn, that Diaz did not want to subject 
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herself to testing “because it would show she was presently under the influence 
of some drug,” because she, in fact, subjected herself to testing. 
 Diaz attempts to bolster her argument on the third prong, by contending 
that the alleged “infer[ence]” of “consciousness of guilt” “is important because the 
State’s case otherwise hinged on the DRE and the hospital test results showing 
she was impaired” even though, she claims, “there were serious questions as to 
whether either of those evaluations actually showed that.”  (Appellant’s Brief, 
p.9.)  This argument fails.  Diaz failed the DRE, and the lab results confirmed 
why she did.  This evidence, coupled with the reported driving pattern, the 
officers’ observations of Diaz’s erratic behavior, the fact that Diaz passed out 
while in the patrol car after she was arrested (Trial Tr., p.203, L.21 – p.204, 
L.12), and Diaz’s own statements to law enforcement about the medications that 
were prescribed to her (Trial Tr., p.175, L.25 – p.177, L.5), easily defeat any 
claim by Diaz that the jury would not have convicted her of driving under the 
influence absent some speculative inference that she demonstrated 
“consciousness of guilt” by agreeing to a urinalysis instead of a blood draw.    
Diaz has failed to carry her burden of establishing fundamental error in 
relation to Officer Moe’s testimony because, contrary to Diaz’s assertions, the 
complained of testimony did not clearly violate her constitutional rights, nor is 
there any reasonable probability that it affected the outcome of the trial.  See 




2. Officer Carter’s Unobjected-to Testimony That It Was His Opinion That 
Diaz Was Impaired On CNS Depressants, CNS Stimulants, And 
Narcotic Analgesics While Diaz Was Driving Did Not Violate Any Of 
Diaz’s Constitutional Rights  
 
Officer Carter, who performed the DRE on Diaz, testified, in relevant part:  
 
. . . I came to the determination that [Diaz] was impaired while she 
operating that vehicle.  And just under the DRE status is a drug 
defined as any substance that when taken into the human body 
can impair the ability of a person who can operate a vehicle safely.  
You know, I felt operating the vehicle at that time at [sic] the stop, 
she was impaired.  I came to the conclusion she was impaired on 
CNS depressants, CNS stimulants and narcotic analgesics. 
 
(Trial Tr., p.276, L.21 – p.277, L.5.) 
 
 Diaz claims, for the first time on appeal, that the foregoing testimony was 
fundamental error.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.11-15.)  More specifically, Diaz argues 
that, although “an expert can, based on his observations of a person’s 
performance on tests such as those given during a DRE, give an opinion that the 
person was under the influence of drugs,” he cannot offer an opinion that the 
person was impaired while driving.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.11.)  In short, Diaz 
claims Officer Carter offered improper “opinion testimony” by opining that Diaz 
was impaired while driving, as opposed to opining that Diaz was impaired after 
driving.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.12.)  This argument is necessarily based on the 
permissible scope of opinion testimony under the Idaho Rules of Evidence.  (See 
I.R.E. 702.)  Because Diaz’s claim is based on an alleged violation of the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence, she cannot satisfy the requirements of showing fundamental 
error due to a violation of an unwaived constitutional right.  State v. Norton, 
151 Idaho 176, 182, 254 P.3d 77, 83 (Ct. App. 2011) (“This Court will not 
entertain attempts to characterize alleged evidentiary errors, to which no 
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objection was made at trial, as a due process violation of the right to a fair trial in 
a fair tribunal.”).   
Even if Diaz could properly characterize her complaint about Officer 
Carter’s testimony as one of constitutional magnitude, compare State v. 
Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 66-67, 253 P.3d 727, 740-741 (2011),3 Diaz has not met 
her burden of showing the failure to object was not a tactical decision, or her 
burden of showing a reasonable probability that the alleged error “affected the 
outcome of the trial court proceedings.”  Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 
978.  This is true for the same reasons Diaz has not met her burden of showing 
prejudice with respect to Officer Moe’s challenged testimony.  Specifically, 
regardless of Officer Carter’s opinion that Diaz was driving while under the 
influence, Diaz concedes Officer Carter could testify to his opinion that Diaz was 
“impaired on CNS depressants, CNS stimulants and narcotic analgesics” after 
she was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence (Appellant’s Brief, 
p.11), and Officer Moe had already testified that he arrested Diaz “for suspicion 
of DUI” (Trial Tr., p.195, Ls.18-20).  This testimony in conjunction with the 
evidence of Diaz’s driving pattern, her erratic behavior, the fact that Diaz passed 
out while in the patrol car after she was arrested, the lab results showing the 
presence of several drugs in Diaz’s system, and Diaz’s own statements to law 
enforcement about the medications that were prescribed to her (Trial Tr., p.175, 
                                            
3 In Ellington, the Court concluded that an officer’s testimony that the defendant 
acted intentionally was inadmissible under I.R.E. 702.  151 Idaho at 65-66, 253 
P.3d at 739-740.  The Court further stated that, if the challenge to the officer’s 
testimony would have been raised as a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, it 
would have found the “conduct was improper.”  Id. at 67, 253 P.3d at 741. 
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L.25 – p.177, L.5), support the conclusion that there is no reasonable probability 
of a different verdict in this case.  Diaz has failed to carry her burden of 




 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon Diaz’s convictions for driving without privileges and felony driving under the 
influence.   
 DATED this 8th day of May, 2017. 
 
       
 __/s/ Jessica M. Lorello____ 
 JESSICA M. LORELLO 








CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 8th day of May, 2017, served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an 
electronic copy to: 
 
 BRIAN R. DICKSON 
 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 




      _/s/ Jessica M. Lorello_____ 
 JESSICA M. LORELLO 
 Deputy Attorney General 
JML/dd 
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